Incentive Structures in Federal Government

Abstract

This paper examines how the incentive structures of the United States federal government — originally designed to balance power through competing ambition — have evolved into a system that rewards continuity, self-preservation, and alignment among elites. Drawing on constitutional commentary, political theory, and empirical evidence, it traces how the Founders’ expectation that “ambition must be made to counteract ambition” has weakened under modern conditions of incumbency, partisanship, and bureaucratic interdependence. The analysis surveys five domains of misalignment — legislative tenure, congressional pay, executive authority, campaign structures, and partisan gridlock — demonstrating how each transforms institutional self-interest from a safeguard into a constraint. It concludes that sustainable governance requires not the elimination of ambition but its refinement: aligning personal advancement with public service so that self-interest once again sustains, rather than subverts, the republic’s balance.

DISCLAIMER: This paper was written with the assistance of artificial intelligence.